This change of the spatial framework of history 'beyond the nation' corresponded to a change of the temporal framework 'beyond politics'. By distinguishing the famous three time layers of the short, the medium and the long term, Braudel only made explicit what other Annalistes had taken for granted. He identified political history with the short time frame -with the 'history of events' -and conceptualized the events as 'surface' phenomena; as being conditioned by the middle-term (economic) 'conjunctures' and by the (demographic, technological and biological) 'structures' underpinning them 'in depth'. Therefore 'new' political history could only regain a 'scientific' legitimacy when and where the academic hegemony of the Annales started to crumble.
After the Second World War comparative history was again forcefully advertised by a new generation of -usually 'social scientific' -historians, on the basis of the same arguments that had been put forward by Pirenne and Bloch in the 1920s. 7 Now the Annales approach was widely and increasingly 'copied' outside France. And although comparison, for some time, became a growth industry in history -including specialist journals like Comparative Studies in Society and History and Comparativ -just like in the inter-war period, the comparative method failed to 'conquer' the fortresses of national history. Even much of what was presented as 'social scientific' history remained embedded in the framework of national history, as Lutz Raphael argued, for the German brand of 'history of society'; the Gesellschaftsgeschichte.
After the 1980s 'social science history' was pushed into the defensive again by 'new cultural' and 'narrative' history, which usually focused on single cases again -something which is also true for the 'history of everyday life' and 'microhistory'. 8 Many of the younger generation historians had become convinced by the 1980s that social-scientific comparative history had failed to deliver the promised goods. In their eyes, comparison had not turned history into a more 'scientific' discipline than before, nor had comparison solved the problem of 'the politics of history' -which was one of the two reasons why Pirenne and Bloch had put comparison on the historians' agenda. The project of comparative history therefore has lost some of its former 'scientific' attractions to 6 P. Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire', Representations, 26 (1989), 7-25, esp. 8-9. 7 What I have argued for comparative history also stands for the comparative history of history writing, better known as comparative historiography -which is the topic I will be dealing with in this chapter. Like history, historiography has basically been practised from its very beginning predominantly within specific national frameworks. 10 So, unsurprisingly, the two problems of national history -its unreflected single case character and its unreflected political character -have largely been reproduced in its historiography.
In historiography, however, we can expect 'double trouble'; both at the level of the individual national histories -of, for example, Winkler's Germany or of Braudel's France -and at the level of the history of national histories -of, for example, Iggers's history of German historiography or of Gildea's history of French historiography.
11 At both levels statements are usually made about particularity (of a national history respectively of a national historiography) without any explicit form of comparative argument. 12 Therefore, in historiography, comparison must be analysed in a double sense -and here I go beyond Marc Bloch's argument. Bloch's argument that the particularity of German or French history can only be established by means of -in this case: internationalcomparison, also holds for any individual representation of German or French history. Today we need to reflect on our historiographical predicament that every representation of German or French history is comparative because it is (implicitly or explicitly) international and on the fact that the particularities of each representation -of a nation and of a national historiography -can only be established by comparing these representations with each other. 9 See, for overviews, J. Kocka and G. Haupt (eds), Geschichte und Vergleich (Frankfurt/M., 1996); S. Berger, 'Comparative history', in S. Berger, H. Feldner and K. Passmore (eds), Writing History: Theory & Practice (London, 2003) , pp. 161-83. In Germany comparative history seems to be taken more seriously than in the UK or in France. Now that more research-funding is channelled through EU-institutions, probably comparative projects will profit from this trend because the EU is a supranational institution. 10 For the continuing dominance of the national framework in history, see S. Conrad This is the inescapable and lasting consequence of the 'linguistic turn' in historiography: the movement from 'epistemological naïvety' -the ideal to 'show the history of history writing as it essentially was' -to self-reflexivitythe recognition that the study of history writing implies a double comparison of its representational forms -of different representations of the same nation and of representations of different nations. 13 With the awareness of the problem of representation in general, and of the history of representation in particular, the borderlines between 'plain' history and historiography in principle vanish, because self-reflective history writing implies a positioning vis à vis preceding and competing representations -and therefore implies historiography. Below I will analyse this double comparison in national history writing -and thus 'double trouble' -on the basis of German and Quebec historiography.
14 In this chapter I will revitalize the project of comparative history and of comparative historiography by arguing that, basically, there is no way to avoid it. The only choice historians are facing is that of being explicit about their comparative judgements in epistemic and political matters, or to leave them implicit. So, all in all, and contrary to Pirenne and Bloch, I will argue that comparison is not something to be 'advertised' to historians -including historians of historiography -but argue that since the 'linguistic turn' and the recognition of 'representationalism', it is the historians professional condition. And again, contrary to Bloch and Pirenne, I will argue that comparison cannot 'cure' historians from their national and political 'embeddedness', but can only make this 'embeddedness' more discursive, that is, by making their 'politics of comparison' transparent and open to criticism. In this sense, we have become 'sadder and wiser' than Pirenne and Bloch in their day. And what holds for historians in general also holds for historians of historiography.
The chapter is structured as follows: in the first part of my chapter I will give a short overview of two very different and unconnected traditions of national historiography in order to flesh out their inherent comparative and political aspects. I will argue that both temporal and spatial differentiations in history have a political dimension. First, I will deal with twentieth-century historiography of Germany and then I will deal with twentieth-century historiography of Quebec. I will present the argument for this tantalizing comparison below.
Within both German and Quebec historiography I will distinguish between two contrasting discourses or paradigms -one emphasizing Germany's and Quebec's 'special path' into modernity and one, emphasizing Germany's and Quebec's essential 'normality' or generality.
In the second part of my chapter I will compare the two German and the two Quebec historiographical paradigms in order to identify some similarities and differences. On the basis of these comparisons I will analyse the comparative character of historiography in general, as well as its relationship to the past and to its political functions in the present.
My reason for the unlikely comparison of Germany -an independent state of some 80 million people in the middle of Europe -and Quebec -the second province of the Canadian federation containing fewer than 8 million people -is that these two cases are so different and unconnected that their historiographies can be regarded as unrelated, and thus as -relatively -'independent' or 'isolated' cases vis à vis each other. This implies from a Millean point of view that if German and Quebec historiography show interesting similarities -and I will argue that this is the case -then these similarities cannot be explained as the result either of their particular causal interrelationship or as the result of some form of transfer because both have developed as relatively 'closed systems' in relation to each other. 15 Instead, I will argue that these similarities in historiography can best be explained as products of two similar discourses which have resulted in similar narrative schemes of representing the nations' past. Moreover, I will argue that in both the German and the Quebec case the historical discourses are connected to similar ways of experiencing the nation's past. Now, before I start to compare, I want to emphasize that comparison is never epistemologically 'innocent' because comparison is always based on theoretical assumptions -especially about which features in the cases compared have an explanatory relevance and which features are only 'background conditions'. 16 Therefore, what happens in every comparison is basically that a specific hypothesis is 'tested' against selected evidence and eventually against other 'competing' hypotheses. This lack of 'epistemological innocence' also stands true for the comparisons I am offering concerning the particularity and normality of the national histories of Germany and Quebec. 17 After my introductory clarifications regarding the concepts and purposes of my chapter I will start with the first part, the overview of two twentiethcentury German and Quebec historiographical paradigms.
15 R. Rudin, Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec (Toronto, 1997), has argued that Quebec historiography also developed relatively independent of Anglo-Saxon Canadian historiography -which is remarkable given its spatial proximity. 16 Let us first turn to German historiography. In The Shattered Past, their recent overview of German historiography, Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer observe that German historiography in the twentieth century has been dominated by two versions of the so-called Sonderweg grand narrative. The basic idea of all Sonderweg interpretations is that German history has been following a 'special path', or Sonderweg, into modernity in comparison to other European states.
18 Whilst other great powers in Europe, such as England and France, developed strong forms of 'civil society and of representational democracy, Germany did this to a significant lesser extent -at least until 1945. Instead, Germany developed a remarkably powerful state, with a dominant position occupied by the aristocratic military and the executive. So Sonderweg historians posit that there is basically something very peculiar about modern German history -an idea that was rooted in the experience of the generations that lived during the first half of the twentieth century with its two world wars and the Holocaust.
As for the explanation of Germany's special characteristics there are two versions of the Sonderweg interpretation that are diametrically opposed. The geopolitical version of the Sonderweg paradigm posits that Germany's geographical position in the centre of Europe -its Mittellage -made it extremely vulnerable to interventions from its mighty neighbours, as European history since the Thirty Years War had amply demonstrated. Therefore, Germans had learned the hard way that they needed a strong army and a strong state if they wanted to survive as an autonomous nation 'in the centre of Europe', and therefore that Germany could not afford the 'luxury' of democracy. Only Prussia had put this 'lesson' of history into practice, when it gradually united most of the German states into one German nation-state in the aftermath of the catastrophic defeats in the Napoleonic Wars. As long as Germany kept its status as great power -roughly between 1871 and 1945 -this special path of Germany was valued in a very positive way by most German historians.
Unsurprisingly after the end of the Second World War, the Sonderweg of Germany was seen a bit differently than before. Because Germany had lost the war, its eastern territories and its political autonomy, the German Sonderweg was increasingly represented as a catastrophic cul-de-sac. It was therefore subject to a serious revision by liberal and leftist historians, who harked back to the émigré-historians like Eckart Kehr and Hans Rosenberg. As the Bundesrepublik and its Wirtschaftswunder conquered the hearts and minds of most West German citizens, the lack of democracy and the dominant position of the state in the Second and the Third Reich were now reinterpreted as fatal and negative aspects of modern German history. 19 Something had gone terribly wrong since German unification in 1871, resulting in two interrelated world wars and followed by Germany's dissolution as an autonomous state. Those aspects which had been valued as 'assets' to modern German history in the geopolitical Sonderweg paradigm, were now inverted in the 'critical' Sonderweg interpretation.
According to the 'critical' Sonderweg-paradigm, the catastrophes of the twentieth century could be explained by the fact that between 1871 and 1945 Germany had been combining a 'pre-modern' authoritarian, political system with a 'modern' economic system. Until 1945, Germany had thus been 'missing' a 'modern' democracy and was thus plagued by the problem of partial modernization. This was the new Sonderweg paradigm which became very influential between the late sixties and the early 1980s. Therefore, German 'national' history had been comparative all the time, although usually implicitly and therefore not argued. 20 From the 1980s onwards, the presupposition of a special German 'abnormality' came increasingly under attack. 21 Historians like Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn began to argue that there is no such thing as 'normal' history and that German history was as 'normal' -or abnormal -as English, French or American history. This strand of representation got further tailwind after German reunification in 1990, interpreting this event as Germany's return to 'normal' Western statehood and democracy, and putting an end to the post-war era. Heinrich-August Winkler's magnum opus about Germany's 'long way towards the West' is a specimen of this new type of 'normalizing' history in which a unified Germany and a unified Europe are represented as the telos of catastrophic twentieth-century history. 22 Contrary to the positive and the negative German history, the new post-reunification orthodoxy is eager to emphasize the fundamental 'normality' of German's modern history -Germany being 'beyond' its twentieth-century catastrophes.
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This normalizing, post-Sonderweg paradigm accomplishes this change of perspective by replacing a backward-looking perspective -focusing on the 'fall' of Germany in two world wars, including the Holocaust -to a presentist perspective -focusing on the rise of a reunified Germany as a strong and stable Western democracy. This change from a backward to a presentist temporal focus at the same time constitutes a change from a critical to a positive view on German history. The focus changes from Germany's catastrophes -two world wars, the Weimar crisis and the Holocaust -to present accomplishmentsdemocracy, stability, welfare and a united Europe.
Let's now take a look at the paradigm of the 'special path' of Quebec. Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec, a recent historiographical overview by Ronald Rudin, starts from the observation that history occupies a privileged place in Quebec culture. 24 The official motto of the only province of Canada with a French-speaking majority -'Je me souviens' ('I remember') -is but one indicator of its obsession with the past.
The special place of history in Quebec obviously is due to the fact that Quebec is the principal remnant of what used to be the French Empire in North America. to the 'survival' of the 'French nation' -'la survivance' -in North America. The French period before the conquest simultaneously acquired the position of being the 'golden period' in Quebec's past -and for some even a 'lost paradise' which had to be regained in the future. By labelling the Quebecois as one 'nation' -or one 'race', as Groulx did -the Quebec historians staked out Quebec's claim to political autonomy. According to this view, Canada was a federal state containing two hierarchically positioned nations: the British and the French. From an ethnic nationalist perspective, Canada thus was a 'forced marriage' from its very beginning: an 'artificial' state doomed to fail -although the American Revolution had forced the British to accommodate 'the French fact' in the remaining part of 'British North America'. This view was still the dominant one when the French president, Charles de Gaulle, broke all the international diplomatic rules during his visit to Quebec in 1967, among other things by advocating a 'free Quebec'.
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Until the early 1950s there was little doubt among the dominant Quebecois historians that Quebec had been following a 'special path' in North American history. Quebec was basically represented as a French island in the midst of an AngloSaxon ocean, under permanent threat of 'cultural extinction' if the Quebecois did not protect their 'national' culture in a vigilant and self-conscious way -not unlike those German historians which represented Germany as being 'encircled' and under a permanent external (Slav) 'threat' in the middle of Europe'. 26 This particularistic (victimization) view was by no means homogeneous. The interpretation of the British conquest especially differed between the so-called Montreal and Laval Schools. While the Montreal School tended to evaluate the conquest as pure tragedy for the Quebecois, the Laval School developed a more redemptive 'revision' of this key event. Instead of constituting a permanent threat to the 'cultural survival' of the French 'Quebec-nation', the British take-over was represented (by Groulx) as a 'blessing in disguise' because it had 'shielded' the Catholic 'New French' against the unholy consequences of the secular French Revolution. 27 Just like in other 'stateless nations' -for instance, 25 See D. C. Poland between the Third Polish Partition in 1795 and its 'resurrection' in 1918, or Greece between the end of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 and its 'resurrection' in 1827 28 -the Church in Quebec was often represented as playing such a fundamental role in 'rescuing' the Nation, that the national and religious identities tended to overlap completely.
This historiographical state of affairs existed until revisionism began to make its way into Quebec historiography in the 1960s. Simultaneously with rapid industrialization and secularization of Quebec in the wake of the Second World War -during Quebec's 'Wirtschaftswunder' alias the 'Quiet Revolution' -quite a few Quebec historians began to turn their backs on Quebec's particularistic historiographical paradigm. Instead of emphasizing the continuing particularity of 'the French fact' in Anglo-Saxon North America, the revisionists started stressing Quebec's essential 'normality'. The revisionists started to represent Quebec as a 'normal' modern, industrial Western society, characterized by the unfolding process of industrialization, urbanization and economic rationalization since 1850 -and not by its French language or by its specific culture. The discourse of 'normality' and the discourse of 'modernity' actually went hand in hand, because being 'modern' simply meant being 'normal'. History writing thus reflected a fundamental change in the way Quebecois historians came to represent Quebec history from the 1960s onwards. They started to focus on present accomplishments instead of focusing on past problems; which is quite similar to what many historians of the 'Bundesrepublik' did from the 1960s onwards. Whatever 'modernization' meant, it certainly meant an orientation towards the future and a belief in 'progress'. So 'modernized' Quebec history was no longer history absorbed by a 'black hole' in the past.
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Just like their colleagues in the 'Bundesrepublik', historians in Quebec started to explain past problems in terms of 'missing' something 'normal', in regarded the German Imperial Army, like the German emperor himself, as a negative force in German politics, this negative force had 'shielded' Germany from the unholy consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution in Germany through the Groener-Ebert pact in 1918 which put down the German revolutionary movement by armed force. What looked like a catastrophe from a left-wing point of view -the German Social Democratic party cooperating with the German imperial army in order to put down a socialist revolution -was subsequently reinterpreted as -national -redemption. 28 See Effi Gazi's contribution in Chapter 9 of this volume. 29 This finding suggests that Chakrabarty's influential criticism of 'historicism' is only partially correct, i.e., only in so far as 'historicism' is based on ideas of modernity and on history as a process of 'modernization'. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ, 2000), esp. p. 8: 'Historicism -and even the modern, European idea of history -one might say, came to the non-European peoples in the nineteenth century as somebody's way of saying "not yet" to somebody else', thus turning history for them into a kind of 'waiting room'. Chakrabarty thus seems to miss the catastrophic versions of 'historicism'. other words, in terms of a partial lack of modernity -especially the problem of Quebec's relative poverty and its economic backwardness vis à vis the 'Rest of Canada'. Some historians pointed at the Catholic Church as the stumbling block on Quebec's path towards modernity (Marcel Trudel for instance), whilst others argued that the lack of economic rationality of Quebec's bourgeoisie was the stumbling block, preventing this bourgeoisie from adapting to the modern economy (Fernand Ouellet, for instance). Still others -especially from the Montreal School -argued that because of the absence of France since the Conquest, Quebec was 'missing' a 'normal' break with colonialism.
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From a comparative perspective, one can be struck by the similarity of the explanation of Quebec's problem of economic 'backwardness' and the explanation of Germany's problem of Nazism in terms of 'stumbling blocks' towards modernization -especially in its Bielefeld variety. In the case of Germany, however, the explanatory problem was not located in Germany's lack of economic modernization, but in its 'lack of political modernization' -eventually leading to Nazism. Moreover, the critical Sonderweg historians of the 'Bundesrepublik' held the 'feudal aristocracy' responsible for Germany's lack of 'political modernity' before 1945 and not primarily the Church, as their colleagues in Quebec did. And just as in the case of Quebec, the 'feudalized' German bourgeoisie was criticized for its lack of modernity -at least until 1945. Only during the 'Bundesrepublik', did Germany become truly 'modern' by 'catching up with the West'.
Rudin interprets this paradigm shift both as a product and as a producer of a new collective identity of Quebec. 'Particularistic' Quebec history had had a clear backward-looking orientation, focusing on the French origins and the subsequent loss of seventeenth-to eighteenth-century 'Nouvelle France'. Therefore it had been centred on the French period and on the consequential defeats against the British. History writing functioned as a kind of mental medicine helping the Quebecois to cope with their 'phantom pain' due to their 'dismemberment' from France, so to speak -while simultaneously infusing this idea of 'dismemberment' into every new generation. Simultaneously, this 'particularistic' paradigm was projecting the idealized origin of political autonomy of the French in North-America into the future -creating a continuity between Quebec's origin in the past and its future -wishing for telos. The revisionists replaced this backward-looking orientation by a presentist orientation that represented Quebec as a 'normal' and 'modern' nation situated amongst other 'normal' and 'modern' nations in North America. As in the German case, the change from a backward to a presentist perspective corresponds to a change in focus from past problems to present accomplishments. A tragic storyline and plot, focusing on lost glory and ensuing struggle, suffering and endurance -'survival' -was replaced by a more epic and redemptive storyline, focusing on present 'successes' and future promises.
32 This is my brief sketch of twentieth-century German and Quebec historiography so far.
Which analyses about historiography can be derived from the comparison of the German and Quebec historiographies? My first point is not very surprising, but needs to be stated in the context of historiography: although there is only one German and one Quebec past, there are multiple and competing narratives of German and Quebec history at the same time. Elsewhere I have argued that the multiplicity of historical narratives and the centrality of debate between them in history as a discipline can be accounted for in terms of 'internal realism'.
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My second point is more surprising. This is the conclusion that although Germany and Quebec are literally worlds apart, their historians have developed two surprisingly similar narrative frameworks in which they represent their national histories. The first common narrative framework focuses on the 'special path' the nation has followed entering modernity. There are two varieties of this framework: one attributing the 'special character' to the nations special location in space -in the form of the permanent presence of 'external threats' to overcome from its early origins onwards -and the second variety attributing the 'special character' to the nations special location in time -in the form of a partial 'delay' in political development. 34 With Rudin, we could label this the The second common narrative framework focuses on the essential 'normality' of the nation's path to modernity, focusing on the processes of both economic growth and urbanization and on the welfare state. This framework focuses primarily on the economy and on the society of a nation-state. With Rudin, we could label this the discourse of normality. So both the national histories of Germany and of Quebec are based on judgements about particularity and normality -and that is to say: they are based on implicit comparisons of the nation's history to those of other nations.
My third point is that due to their choice of a narrative framework, both German and Quebec historians are making choices in relation to spatial frames of reference of other nations. At this point we can locate what we could call the 'politics of spatial comparison' of historians -and here we confront an inherently political dimension of writing history. Paradoxical as it may sound, historians have rarely recognized space as a political construction. As with the politics of time (see below), the politics of space was put on the agenda not by a historian, but by the literary scholar Edward Said with his path breaking book on Orientalism.
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Within the spatial framework of Canada, for instance, Quebec historians have represented Quebec as the only French-speaking entity with formal status as a 'distinct society' and as a distinct 'nation' -next to the British nation. The idea that the native population of Quebec could qualify as its 'First Nation' has only been a very recent one -due to the rise of 'multiculturalism'. 36 that 'historical' claims to nationhood are inextricably linked to political claims to citizenship and to self-government.
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Within the spatial framework of the 'New Nations', however, Quebec has been simultaneously represented as the only New Nation in the New World that did not attain political sovereignty, as Gérard Bouchard recently argued. 38 Bouchard has thus compared Quebec to the 'new nations' like New Zealand and Australia. By comparing Quebec with independent nations abroad he has 'severed', the 'Quebec nation' from the 'Rest Of Canada' -and thus brought the particularity paradigm of Quebec to its logical end.
Similar conclusions can be drawn concerning the spatial frameworks of the two Sonderweg paradigms in German historiography. The 'positive' Sonderweg paradigm compares Germany spatially with both Russia and France by representing Germany as 'the empire in the middle', whilst the 'negative' Sonderweg paradigm compares Germany exclusively with France, England and the United States. The past itself does not force historians to use one spatial framework or the other. It is rather the other way around. What the past of Quebec or Germany looks like is defined by the spatial frame of reference -although, of course, the past in turn restricts the range of plausible representations.
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The spatial frame of reference in narrative representations always remains dependent on the choices of the historian in the present. Hayden White was right in this respect. This holds true even if we accept that these choices are conditioned by the past and thus are not just 'fictions of factual representation'. White was wrong in this respect. Different narrative frameworks may imply different primary criteria of relevance. The representation of Germany as 'the empire in the middle' implies the primary relevance of spatial markers, whilst the representation of Germany as a 'belated democracy' implies the primary relevance of temporal markers -as does the representation of Germany as 'the Holocaust nation'. Time and space can also be interrelated -as is the case in all brands of modernization theory and in many brands of globalization theory -when 'the West' is represented as history's telos and as the implicit destiny for the rest of the world. 41 Sebastian Conrad has aptly coined this phenomenon the 'spatialization of time'. 42 This idea is also the basis of Chakrabarty's critique of the presupposition of 'historicism' that the world is divided into both regions which are somehow ahead in time and regions which are somehow still in the "waiting room' and in need of 'catching up'. My fourth point is that through their choice of a narrative framework, both German and Quebec historians are making choices as to their temporal frame of reference.
A strong emphasis on particularity seems to correspond with a temporal orientation which points back in time to a particular origin or identity-creating event and simultaneously points to a future telos. In historiography focusing on Quebec's particularity, this correspondence manifests itself in the emphasis on the former political autonomy of the French nation vis à vis the British and simultaneously in its emphasis on the future telos of regaining this 'lost' political autonomy. In historiography focusing on Germany's particularity, this correspondence is revealed in the centrality of the foundation of the Kaiserreich of 1871 and simultaneously in its emphasis on the future telos of safeguarding Germany's hegemonic position in the middle of Europe -if necessary by striving for world power status. In the 'positive' German Sonderweg paradigm this telos was justified, whereas in the 'negative' Sonderweg paradigm it was criticized.
In contrast to this emphasis on particularity, an emphasis on normality seems to correspond with a temporal focus on the present, which points at a present state of normality and thus neither focuses explicitly on identitycreating events in the past nor on a future telos in the making. So the change from an emphasis on particularity to normality seems to imply a change of emphasis between the three dimensions of time: past, present and future. In both the German and the Quebec case, the 'normalizing' force is represented as economic rather than as political. In the German case, it is the 'economic miracle' and in the Quebec case it is the 'Quiet Revolution'.
At this point, we can locate the 'politics of temporal comparison' of historians and here, too, we confront an inherently political dimension of writing history,
